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Contract Formation Under the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Commercial Code
I. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods' is an international analog to Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 which governs domestic sales of goods.3
The United States now has ratification of the Convention under con-
sideration.4 If the Convention is ratified, it will displace the Code in
some international sales of goods. 5 Because American traders may
be subject to the Convention even if it is not ratified by the United
States,6 counsel must become acquainted with both its role in inter-
national transactions and its substantive provisions.
One of the greatest impediments to development of interna-
tional trade is the plethora of national laws; international sales con-
tracts are governed by national laws so diverse that contract obliga-
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CISGI, reprinted in United Na-
tions Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records at 178,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Official Records], and in 19 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 671 (1980).
Throughout the text, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods will be referred to as the "Convention." The Commentary on the Draft Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Commentary], reprinted in Official Records, supra,
at 14, will be referred to as the "Commentary." The 1978 version of the Uniform Commercial
Code will be referred to as the "Code." The Restatement of Contracts, Second will be termed
the "Restatement."
The Convention is organized into four "Parts," and further divided into "articles." Subdi-
visions of articles will be referred to as "paragraphs." The major divisions of the Code are
called "Articles," which are divided into hyphenated "sections." The Restatement is arranged
by "sections" without hyphens. This terminology will be used uniformly.
2. U.C.C. Art. 2 (1978).
3. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 1-105(1) comment 2.
4. The United States signed the Convention on August 31, 1981, as provided under
article 91. On September 21, 1983, President Reagan submitted the Convention to the Senate
with his recommendation that it give its advice and consent to ratification. Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 1983), reprinted in 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1290, 1290 (Sept. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Presidential
Message, with page numbers referring to WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.].
5. See, e.g., Dore, Choice of Law under the International Sales Convention: A U.S.
Perspective, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 538-39 (1983).
6. See id. at 536-38. See infra text accompanying note 65.
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tions can be uncertain. 7 International sales are now governed by the
law of the state that has the most significant contact with a transac-
tion, which is usually the place where contract formation occurred.8
Domestic conflict of laws rules sometimes fail to clearly indicate
which body of national law will be applied, and the conflict rules of
different states sometimes select different laws under identical cir-
cumstances.9 Diversity of national laws combined with conflict of
laws uncertainties create an opportunity to shop for the most advan-
tageous forum. 10 One solution to these problems lies in a uniform
sales law that transcends domestic law; it must be applicable without
regard to domestic conflict rules and it must be comprehensive
enough to replace diverse domestic laws with a single set of rules."
The Convention aspires to the role of a transcendent uniform
law. In order to lend uniformity to international sales law, the Con-
vention must reduce the necessity of resorting to domestic conflict
rules to determine applicable law and it must reduce forum shop-
ping. 2 The second section of this Comment is a brief history of the
effort to unify international sales law. The third section is concerned
with uniformity. The applicability of the Convention with regard to
both forum shopping and reliance on domestic conflict rules will be
discussed. Ratification procedures are then considered in light of
their direct effect on uniformity. The fourth section compares major
provisions of the Convention with domestic American law of contract
formation. This section catalogs similarities and differences of the
Code and Convention so that demands of the Convention can be
anticipated.
7. Matteucci, Unification of Conflicts Rules in Relation to International Unification
of Private Law, in THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 150, 151 (1949)
("The two typical disadvantages arising from diversity of laws are: (1) the difficulty of identi-
fying the law to be applied to the case; (2) once such law is identified, the difficulty of knowing
and of interpreting its provisions.").
8. See G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLE-
MENT OF DISPUTES (A STUDY IN CONFLICT AVOIDANCE) § 2.02 (booklet 2.1, Nov. 1982).
9. See id. at § 2.02; Rabel, International Sales Law, in THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 34 (1949).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60 and 64-65.
I1. Cf. Matteucci, supra note 7, at 152-54 (the problems involved in researching and
interpreting foreign law are discussed in the course of asserting that unification efforts must be
directed to both conflicts law and substantive law).
12. The three major purposes of the Convention are: (1) to reduce forum shopping; (2)
to reduce the necessity of resorting to rules of private international law; and (3) to provide a
modern law appropriate for international sales of goods. Commentary, art. 1, note 4.
The value of the Commentary is discussed in Winship, A Note on the Commentary of the
1980 Vienna Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 37, 38 (1984) ("[Alithough the Secretariat's Com-
mentary is not an official document and has not been updated, it remains an important source
of background information about the policies behind specific provisions of the Vienna
convention.").
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II. Previous Efforts to Unify International Sales Law
Efforts to draft a generally acceptable uniform law on interna-
tional sales have been underway for over fifty years. Beginning in
April of 1930, the International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law (UNIDROIT) undertook the project of drafting a uniform
law on international sales of goods. 13 Major events in subsequent
drafting include the Diplomatic Conference called by the Nether-
lands in 1950, the 1964 Hague Conference, the 1978 convention held
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCI-
TRAL), and the 1980 convention in Vienna.14
The project began when Mussolini offered the League of Na-
tions backing for an institution, situated in Rome, that would work
on the unification of law.15 In 1930, UNIDROIT (informally known
as the Rome Institute) appointed a committee to draft a uniform law
on international sales of goods (ULIS). 6 The committee was com-
posed of experts from England, France, Germany, and Sweden.1"
Two drafts were prepared and distributed to governments for com-
ments through the League of Nations, the first in 1935 and the re-
vised draft in 1939.18 Work on the project was stopped in 1939 by
the Second World War. l9
UNIDROIT resumed the project in 1951 at a diplomatic con-
ference called by the Netherlands at the Hague."0 Attending the
Conference on the Uniform Sales Law were representatives of
twenty-one nations, the United Nations, UNIDROIT, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and observers from five nations, in-
cluding the United States. 21 The Conference accepted the 1939
UNIDROIT draft as the basis for future work, and appointed the
Special Committee to revise the draft on the basis of suggestions
made at the Conference.12 The Special Committee produced two re-
vised drafts, the first in 1956 and the final draft in 1963.23 During
this period, UNIDROIT prepared a Uniform Law on the Formation
13. Historical Introduction to the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Historical Introduction], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 1, at 3-4.
14. See generally Historical Introduction, supra note 13.
15. Nadelmann, The United States and Plans for a Uniform (World) Law on Interna-
tional Sales of Goods, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 697, 697 (1964).
16. Id. at 697.
17. Id. at 697. Western European nations remained the dominant influence in the unifi-
cation of international sales law through the 1964 Hague Conferences. See infra text accom-
panying notes 37-39.
18. Historical Introduction, supra note 13, at 2.
19. Id. at 1 2.
20. Nadelmann, supra note 15, at 697-98.
21. Id. at 698.
22. Id. at 698.
23. Historical Introduction, supra note 13, at 4.
Fall 1984]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF). 4 Both the
ULF and the 1963 draft of ULIS were submitted to the 1964 Hague
Conference.25
The 1964 Hague Conference marked the first round of Ameri-
can participation in drafting the uniform sales law. 26 Before depart-
ing, the American Delegation was instructed to limit the number of
its proposals (especially if both documents were generally acceptable
to the other delegations) in order to avoid being offensive. 7 They
were also instructed to make no commitment to United States ratifi-
cation even if it appeared that the Conference would produce an ac-
ceptable draft." The three week conference was too short to correct
all the flaws in ULIS and the ULF, and it did not accomplish all
that the Americans had hoped for.29 The American Delegation
signed both Conventions, 3  but did not recommend ratification by the
United States Government.31
The 1964 Conference adopted the two uniform laws, ULIS and
the ULF, as well as the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods (1964 Hague Sales Convention) 2
and the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1964 Hague Forma-
tion Convention). 3 The two 1964 Hague Conventions were opened
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See generally Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, A History with Comments, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 304-08
(1965) (summarizing the events leading up to the passage of domestic legislation that author-
ized the President to send an American delegation to participate in the 1964 Hague
Conference).
27. REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE DIPLO-
MATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS, THE HAGUE, APR. 2-25, 1964, reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 237, 239 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, with page numbers referring to NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE HANDBOOK].
28. Id. at 239.
29. Honnold, The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague Con-
vention of 1964, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoDs. 326, 328-32 (1965) (the hectic pace of the 1964
Hague Convention is recounted by a member of the American Delegation). The American
Delegation found five weaknesses in ULIS. These were: (I) the draft was designed to address
external trade between nations with a common boundary; (2) insufficient attention had been
given to international trade problems involving overseas shipments; (3) the rights and obliga-
tions of sellers and buyers were not well balanced in light of the practical realities of trade
practice; (4) the Uniform Law would not be understood by individuals in the commercial field,
and (5) application of the Uniform Law would have an overly broad scope. AMERICAN DELE-
GATION REPORT, supra note 27, at 241.
30. Honnold, supra note 29, at 331 n.18 ("The United States and nearly all of the
other governments in attendance at the Conference signed [the] Final Act, which comprised a
detailed recital of the events of the Conference; this signature, of course, does not involve any
obligation to ratify the conventions prepared at the Conference.").
31. AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 27, at 246-48.
32. The 1964 Hague Sales Convention and the text of ULIS may be found at 834
U.N.T.S. 107-68 (1972).
33. Historical Introduction, supra note 13, at 6. The 1964 Hague Formation Conven-
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for signature on July 1, 1964. 3' The 1964 Hague Sales Convention
became effective on August 18, 1972, and has been ratified by eight
nations.3 5 The 1964 Hague Formation Convention took effect on Au-
gust 23, 1972, and has been ratified by seven nations.36
Western European domination of the 1964 Conventions is re-
flected in the fact that ULIS and the ULF are essentially products
of civil law. 37 As a consequence of this domination, ULIS and the
ULF had a narrow following.38 After soliciting comments from
Member States of the United Nations, UNCITRAL decided in 1969
to revise ULIS and the ULF in order to make them more widely
acceptable.3 9 The Commission adopted a draft Convention on Sales
at its tenth session in 1977.40 A draft convention on formation was
adopted at the eleventh session in 1978.41 At the 1978 session, the
two draft Conventions were merged to create the draft Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.42 This draft Con-
vention was adopted, with minor modifications, at a Conference of
Plenipotentiaries in April of 1980."
III. Applicability of the Convention-The Goal of Uniformity
A. Sphere of Applicability
Chapter I of the Convention determines its sphere of applicabil-
ity. The key provision, paragraph (1) of article (1), indicates that the
Convention applies to only international sales of goods. International
sales are defined as those between parties whose places of business
are in different states."' Transactions between parties within the
tion and the text of the ULF may be found at 834 U.N.T.S. 196-217 (1972).
34. Historical Introduction, supra note 13, at 6.
35. Id. at T 7. Nations ratifying or acceding to the 1964 Hague Sales Convention in-
clude: Belgium, the Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, the Netherlands (for the
Kingdom in Europe), San Marino, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at T 7. Nations ratifying or acceding to the 1964 Hague Formation Convention
include all those adopting the Sales Convention except Israel. Id. at 1 7. See supra note 35.
37. See Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223, 225 (1979).
38. Id. at 225.
39. Historical Introduction, supra note 13, at 8-10.
40. Id. at I 11.
41. Id. at I11.
42. Id. at I 11.
43. Dore, supra note 5, at 522-23.
44. CISG art. 1(1). Article 10 contains standards for determining the place of business
of a party. Article 10 provides that,
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that
which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, hav-
ing regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract;
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to his
habitual residence.
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same state are governed by the domestic law of that state.45 The
Convention will be applied to an international sale of goods if either:
(a) the place of business of each party is in a contracting state,"6 or
(b) the conflict of laws rule of the forum state calls for application of
the law of a contracting state.47
The remaining articles in Chapter I narrow the sphere in which
the Convention applies. Article 2 prohibits application of the Con-
vention to several types of transactions,4" the most widespread being
sales of goods bought for personal, family, or household use.49 Appli-
cation to hybrid contracts is circumscribed by article 3, which ex-
cludes contracts if the preponderant part of the seller's obligations is
to supply services. 50 The Convention is not concerned with either the
validity of a contract or passage of title to the goods sold. 51 The Con-
vention does not determine the liability of the seller for death or per-
sonal injury caused by the goods.5" The Convention may be entirely
excluded from application by choosing a different law to govern a
contract. 53 Provisions of the Convention may be varied by agree-
Id. art. 10.
45. Commentary, art. 1, note 2.
46. The term "Contracting State" is used throughout the Convention to denote a na-
tion that has ratified the Convention.
47. CISG art. 1.
48. Article 2 states,
This Convention does not apply to sales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor
ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use;
(b) by auction;
(c) on execution or otherwise by authority of law;
(d) of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money;
(e) of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft;
(f) of electricity.
CISG art. 2.
49. Consumer sales are excluded from the Convention in order to avoid impairing do-
mestic consumer protection laws. Commentary, art. 2, note 3.
50. Article 3 provides,
(1) Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are
to be considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to sup-
ply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or
production.
(2) This Convention does not apply to contracts in which the preponderant
part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply
of labour or other services.
CISG art. 3.
The standards in article 3 of the Convention are more definite than the standard in Arti-
cle 2 of the Code. U.C.C. § 2-102 states that "this Article applies to transactions in goods
... .Judicial decisions on the applicability of Article 2 to hybrid sales has produced con-
flicting results. Del Duca, Constitutionality of Statutory Exclusion of Implied Warranties
Challenged-Oscillation Between Expanded and Contractual Application of U.C.C. Article 2,
8 U.C.C. L.J. 5 (1975). The express standards of article 3 should avoid this confusion.
51. CISG art. 4.
52. CISG art. 5.
53. CISG art. 6. By choosing the law of the contract at the time of formation, the
parties may avoid the uncertainties in the applicability of the Convention. See infra text ac-
companying notes 57-59 and 65-66.
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ment;54 the Convention supplies presumptions, that fill only open
terms of a contract. Issues encompassed by these exceptions will be
decided by domestic law rather than by the Convention.
It is generally agreed that the uniform law should be applied
when all parties are from ratifying nations, and article l(l)(a) is
designed to invoke the Convention in this situation. Under paragraph
(1)(a), the Convention automatically 55 governs all international sales
of goods between parties from contracting states when the forum of
litigation is itself a contracting state .5  To the extent that the Con-
vention applies without reference to other conditions, reliance on do-
mestic conflict rules is eliminated.
Application of the Convention becomes contingent on domestic
conflict rules when the forum is not a contracting state. If the con-
flict rule of the forum selects the law of either the forum or another
state that has not adopted the Convention, then the Convention is
not applied .5  Application under article l(1)(a) must be contingent
on domestic conflict rules because a court cannot be precluded from
applying its own conflict rules where the Convention has not been
adopted.5 8 In a transaction between parties from contracting states,
application of the Convention can be manipulated by bringing suit in
a forum with the desired conflict rule. Forum shopping might be
curbed by the duty of good faith found in article 7(1), which applies
throughout the Convention. 9
The opportunity for forum shopping under paragraph (1)(a) is
illustrated by the effect of an acceptance that is lost in the mail.6"
54. CISG art. 6. It is not clear whether implied agreements will be recognized under
article 6. Language providing that "such agreements may be express or implied" appeared in
article 3 of ULIS, but was not incorporated into article 6 of the Convention. Commentators
Dore and DeFranco have used this fact to support their position that an implied agreement to
exclude or vary the Convention will not be enforced. Dore & DeFrance, A Comparison of the
NonSubstantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 53 n.19. Professor Honnold has
taken the position that implied agreements are permissible because UNCITRAL refused to
provide that the exclusion must be express. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES UNDER THlE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 76 (1982). At the 1980 convention
in Vienna, the United Kingdom offered an amendment that would have allowed both express
and implied agreements to vary or exclude the Convention. Pakistan offered an amendment
that would have inserted the word "expressly" after the words "the parties may." Because
both proposals were rejected, the legislative history of the 1980 convention is inconclusive. See
Report of the First Committee, Art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/I 1 (1980), reprinted in Offi-
cial Records, supra note 1, at 82, 85-86.
55. No specific agreement is required to make the Convention applicable once the stan-
dards of article I have been met. An agreement is required only to exclude the Convention
through article 6. Dore, supra note 5, at 531-32.
56. Reczei, The Area of Operation of the International Sales Conventions, 29 AM. J.
COMp. L. 513, 518 (1981); Dore, supra note 5, at 531.
57. Reczei, supra note 56, at 518. See Dore, supra note 5, at 531.
58. Reczei, supra note 56, at 518.
59. The duty of good faith as a general principle in both the CISG and the UCC is
discussed in Dore & DeFranco, supra note 54, at 60-63.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 185-88.
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Hypothetical parties A and B, who are from different contracting
states, are mutually interested in executing a sale of goods. Seller A
sends Buyer B an offer, and B responds by mailing an acceptance.
The acceptance is lost in the mail. The seller is reluctant to tender
the goods because prices have risen sharply. If the buyer brings suit
in a contracting state, the Convention will impose its rule of dispatch
and the frustrated letter of acceptance will not be effective.61 Ac-
ceptance may be effective under the mail box rule of the common
law, which makes acceptance effective upon dispatch." The buyer
can avoid the unfavorable result of the Convention by locating a
noncontracting common law state with jurisdiction over the seller. A
state will have jurisdiction over the seller if he has assets within its
territory and the presence of assets is a basis for assuming jurisdic-
tion under domestic law.63 If the good faith provision of article 7(1)
does not prevent B from bringing suit in a noncontracting state, then
B can manipulate the outcome by forum shopping.
The possibility of forum shopping under paragraph (1)(a) is
magnified in paragraph (l)(b), which does not require that the par-
ties belong to contracting states. The sole condition in applying the
Convention to an international sale of goods under paragraph (1)(b)
is that the conflict rule of the forum directs one to the law of a con-
tracting state. Through the conflict rule of the forum, the Conven-
tion can become the governing law even though neither party is from
a contracting state and the forum is not a contracting state.6 The
Convention may unexpectedly become applicable if, through forum
shopping, one party is able to obtain jurisdiction in a state with an
advantageous conflict rule.6 5
The potential for forum shopping under paragraph (1)(b) is il-
lustrated by the treatment of an irrevocable offer. 6 Hypothetical
Seller A is from the United States and Buyer B is from Canada.
Neither state has ratified the Convention. A offers to sell goods to B
61. CISG art. 18(2).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a) (1979) [hereinafter cited as REST.
2d].
63. Nadelmann, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Conflict of
Laws Imbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 449, 457 (1965).
64. See Commentary, art. 1, note 7; J. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at § 46.
65. The American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice has rec-
ommended that the United States ratify the Convention subject to a reservation declaring that
the United States will not be bound by article 1(1)(b). Section of International Law and Prac-
tice, American Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates (1981), reprinted in 18
INT'L LAW. 39, 39 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report, with page numbers referring to
18 INT'L LAW.]. President Reagan has concurred with this recommendation in his letter of
transmittal. Presidential Message, supra note 4, at 1290. See infra text accompanying notes
78-82. Commentaries expressing concern over unexpected application of the Convention
through article l(1)(b) and those indicating satisfaction with article l(l)(b) are cited in note
82 infra.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
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and indicates that the offer will remain irrevocable for four months.
Two months later there is a sharp rise in the prevailing price of the
goods. When B accepts the offer during the fourth month, A refuses
to tender the goods.
The duration of an irrevocable offer may be different under do-
mestic American law than under the Convention. If B brings suit in
the United States, his acceptance will be held ineffective because the
U.C.C. places a three month limit on the duration of an irrevocable
offer.6 7 B can impose his acceptance on A and enforce the contract
by bringing suit in a forum68 that will apply the Convention, since
the Convention does not set a maximum duration for an irrevocable
offer.69 The transaction will be governed by the Convention if the
conflict rule of the forum imposes the law of a contracting state;
under paragraph (1)(b) it does not matter that neither party is from
a contracting state or that the forum is not a contracting state. This
opportunity for forum shopping allows B to effect the outcome by
invoking the Convention when it is not expected.
Application of the uniform international sales law via domestic
conflict rules has long been an issue. Drafts prior to 1964 applied the
uniform law only when the conflict rule of the forum selected the law
of a signatory nation.7 0 This provision was deleted at the Hague
Conference of 1964 because it was considered too complex, and
ULIS was applied without regard to domestic conflict rules.7 ' At the
1980 Convention in Vienna, several delegations objected to applica-
tion via conflict rules and sought deletion of article 1(1)(b).72 A dele-
gate from the Federal Republic of Germany stated that subpara-
graph (b) introduced an unwelcome element of complexity, and
noted that similar provisions in the 1964 Sales Convention contrib-
uted to its failure to achieve widespread adoption. 7a He stressed that
it is unusual for an international instrument to require its own appli-
cation when neither party is a member of a succeeding state.74 A
Czechoslovakian delegate added that article 1(1)(b) would create
special difficulties in nations that have domestic legislation governing
international sales.75
67. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1978).
68. A state will have jurisdiction over a party who has assets located within its bounda-
ries if the presence of assets is a basis for assuming jurisdiction under domestic law.
Nadelmann, supra note 63, at 457.
69. See CISG art. 16(2).
70. Reczei, supra note 56, at 514.
71. Id. at 514. See ULIS, supra note 32, at art. 2.
72. See Summary Records of the First Committee, First Meeting, at Art. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.I (1980) [hereinafter cited as First Committee] reprinted in Official
Records, supra note 1, at 236, 236-38.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id. at 12.
75. Id. at 14. The special domestic legislation referred to by the Czechoslovakian
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Arguments for retaining article 1 (1)(b) were based on the need
to promote uniformity. A Bulgarian delegate said that contracting
states should regard the Convention as the law applicable to all in-
ternational sales of goods rather than as a special law for sales be-
tween contracting states. Accordingly, paragraph (1)(b) is needed to
apply the Convention to sales between noncontracting states.7" A
French delegate amplified this view by asserting that a state with a
law drafted specifically for international trade has a right to apply
that law rather than its less appropriate domestic legislation. 77 The
policy of fostering uniformity through widespread application of the
Convention can easily create an overly broad scope of application,
which allows unexpected application and forum shopping. States
must assess this balance of tensions in deciding whether to ratify the
Convention subject to a reservation concerning article l(1)(b).Both President Reagan 78  and the American Bar Association
Section on International Law and Practice79 have recommended rati-
fication of the Convention, but have urged the Senate to declare
under article 95 that the United States will not be bound by article
l(1)(b). Making a reservation under article 95 will allow United
States courts to apply domestic law if one party is not from a con-
tracting state;80 forum shoppers will not be able to invoke the Con-
vention against a party from a state that has not ratified the Conven-
tion. This reservation will protect Americans against surprise
application of the Convention in their own courts, but it will not pre-
vent forum shopping in foreign courts where paragraph (1)(b) has
been adopted. Merchants everywhere will need to be alert to the pos-
sibility of being subject to the Convention through article l(l)(b)
unless ratification is universally subject to reservation under article
95.81 Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which the problem of
an overly broad scope has been carried over from ULIS, but most
feel that the scope remains broad enough to allow forum shopping.82
delegate is the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between Organizations of the Member
Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which regulates international trade
between some socialist nations. The concern is that the Convention will displace the General
Conditions in sales between these socialist nations. Reczei, supra note 56, at 520-21.
76. First Committee, supra note 72, at 17.
77. Id. at 19. The proposal to delete article l(l)(b) was defeated by a vote of 25 to 7,
with 10 abstentions, Id. at 29.
78. Presidential Message, supra note 4, at 1290.
79. ABA Report, supra note 65, at 39. Upon signing the Convention in August 1981,
the United States declared its intention to file a reservation excluding article l(l)(b) in the
event of ratification. Dore & DeFranco, supra note 54, at 55 n.28.
80. Dore & DeFranco, supra note 54, at 55; Reczei, supra note 56, at 518.
81. See Dore & DeFranco, supra note 54, at 55-56.
82. The breadth of article l(l)(b) is criticized in Reczei, supra note 56, at 518-19 ("Is
it proper that when neither the judge nor the two litigants belong to a contracting country, the
case should still be decided under a convention that their countries have never ratified?");
Dore, supra note 5, at 540 (expressing concern over forum shopping); Cain, The Vienna Con-
[Vol. 3:1
Fall 19841 INTERNATIONAL SALES
B. Uniform Ratification
The Convention will become a transcendent uniform law only if
it is ratified without local variations. Ratification is treated in Part
IV of the Convention. In addition to outlining the procedures and
conditions under which the Convention will become effective,8" Part
IV allows ratification to be made subject to reservations concerning
selected provisions.84 The opportunity for partial ratification may im-
pede progress toward a transcendent uniform law. Reservations al-
low retention of domestic law when failure to reach a compromise
leaves the Convention unacceptable to certain states.85 It is also nec-
essary to resort to domestic law when the Convention does not ad-
dress an issue.86 Complete uniformity is not necessary to produce a
useful law,8 7 but a minimum level of uniformity is required to avoid
the uncertainties inherent in applying domestic law to international
sales.
Article 92 permits a contracting state to declare it will not be
bound by Part II or Part III of the Convention. A declaration made
in regard to Part II will prevent application of the uniform rules on
formation, allowing private international law to govern the transac-
tion. Under article 94, contracting states with closely related legal
rules may declare that the Convention will not apply to sales be-
tween parties from their states. Disagreement over application via
vention: Posing a New International Law of Sales, 57 CONN. B.J. 327, 329 (1983) (the United
States should not ratify article l(1)(b) because it may lead to application of the Convention in
some situations not contemplated by international traders); Recent Developments, United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 473,
478-79 (1981) (article l(l)(b) creates an element of I4ncertainty in the applicability of the
Convention); Note, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 69 IowA L. REV. 209, 221-
23 (1983) (article 95 does not solve the problem of uncertainty created by article l(l)(b)).
Commentaries satisfied that the Convention has done everything possible to solve the
problems in applying of ULIS include Honnold, supra note 37, at 228 (The 1978 Draft Con-
vention follows a more conservative path than ULIS. The inability to escape the vagaries of
conflicts rules should add impetus to measures for achieving international unification in that
area.); Comment, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Will a Uniform
Law in International Sales Finally Emerge?, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 157, 172 (1979) ("The
Convention's revision of this ULIS abnormality is an example of the former's superiority.").
83. CISG arts. 99-101.
84. Article 98 states, "No reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized
in this Convention." CISG art. 98.
85. "Reservations permitted by a convention usually reflect the quality of the work
done and the degree of agreement actually reached." Nadelmann, supra note 63, at 455.
86. Article 7(2) provides,
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity whith (sic) the general
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conform-
ity whith (sic) the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law.
CISG art. 7(2).
87. The UCC does not attempt to unify all areas of commercial law; section 1-103
provides that general principles of law are applicable unless displaced by particular provisions
of the UCC.
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domestic conflict rules led to the inclusion of article 95, which allows
a contracting state to declare that it will not apply the Convention
using article l(l)(b). The fourth avenue of nonuniform ratification
involves writing requirements. Article 96 allows a contracting state
to override article 11 and subordinate the Convention to domestic
legislation requiring contracts to be made in writing. These possibili-
ties for partial ratification increase the need to keep abreast of di-
verse domestic laws and expand the opportunities for forum shopping
under article l(1)(b).
The Convention permits partial ratification in an effort to be-
come palatable to a broad range of states. When compromises can-
not be reached on specific issues, it may be wise to allow nonuniform
adoption rather than permitting individual issues to foil the entire
project. The consequence of partial adoption, however, is that the
need to resort to domestic law will remain a source of uncertainty in
the law of international sales. Scholars have expressed concern that
uniformity could be lost through widespread use of articles 92, 94,
95 and 96.88 If a substantial number of states ratify the Convention
with reservations, additional work may be necessary to produce a
widely acceptable document.
IV. Contract Formation under the CISG and UCC
This section compares the major provisions of both the Conven-
tion and domestic law concerning issues in contract formation. Part
II of the Convention is devoted to contract formation. This topic is
addressed in Article Two, Part Two of the Code. When the Code is
silent or is supplemented by general principles of law, the Restate-
ment will be used as the representative domestic common law. 9
Several general provisions affecting formation should be noted
before discussing the rules on formation itself. Both the Code and
Convention contain a set of operating presumptions, and invite the
parties to vary those presumptions by agreement.90 While the Code
has a special statute of frauds applicable to sales,91 the Convention
places no requirements on the form of a contract. 92 The Convention
88. See Dore, supra note 5, at 536 ("In particular, the ease and frequency with which
the exceptions are used by international businessmen or their states could undermine the long
term effectiveness of the Convention (even assuming ratification by a substantial number of
countries) by encouraging just the type of forum shopping and reliance on private international
law that the Convention is designed to discourage."); Eorsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 354 (1983)
(Compromises reached by allowing a declaration "impair the unification of law; bluntly speak-
ing, everyone may apply his own law."); Reczei, supra note 56, at 519 (reservations weaken
the universal character of the Convention).
89. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
90. CISG art. 6; U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
91. U.C.C. § 2-201.
92. CISG art. 1H.
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specifically dispenses with a writing requirement in article 11, but 12
recognizes that a nation may elect to impose a writing requirement
by declaration under article 96.
A. Offer
1. Criteria of an Offer.-Definiteness and intent to be bound
are the two criteria of an offer under both the Code and Convention.
Under article 14 of the Convention, a proposal to conclude a con-
tract is an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates an intention
by the offeror to be bound upon acceptance. Section 2-204(1) of the
Code emphasizes the element of intent, allowing a contract to be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement. Section 2-204(3)
requires a degree of definiteness that will create "a reasonably cer-
tain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
An offer must be directed to a specific individual or group of
offerees. The rule stated in article 14(1) of the Convention applies
only to proposals addressed to one or more specific persons. Article
14(2) raises a presumption that a communication not bearing a spe-
cific addressee is an invitation to make offers rather than an offer.
The Convention allows one to accept an offer only if it has been
addressed to him. 93 The Restatement allows acceptance only by a
person whom the offer invites to furnish consideration.94 Both rules
have the effect of preventing acceptance of an offer by uninvited
third parties.
Proposals that are not sent to one or more specific addressees
are called "general" or "public" offers.95 Two examples of general
offers are an announcement addressed to the general public and a
display of goods offered for sale. A general offer may create separate
powers of acceptance in an unlimited number of people.9"
General offers are recognized by Restatement section 29(2),
which states, "An offer may create a power of acceptance in . . .
anyone or everyone who makes a specified promise or renders a spec-
ified performance." Convention article 14(2) allows for public offers
even though a proposal not bearing a specific addressee is presumed
to be only an invitation to make offers. A public declaration may be
deemed an offer if it is clearly intended as an offer and the para-
graph (1) requirements of definiteness and intent to be bound are
satisfied .9 7
93. Commentary, art. 12, note 2.
94. REST. 2d § 52.
95. Commentary, art. 12, note 4.
96. REST. 2d § 29 comment b.
97. CISG art. 14 (2).
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Intent is one criterion of an offer. The Convention requires that
both parties assent to contract obligations. 8 An offer must indicate
an intention of the offeror to be bound in the event of acceptance. 99
Acceptance occurs when the offeree indicates assent to the offer.100
Like the Convention, the Code focuses on the intent of the parties,
allowing a contract to be made in "any manner sufficient to show
agreement."10 1 It is essential that agreement take place during con-
tract formation.
The terms of a proposal must have some degree of definiteness
if it is to be an offer. 102 The Convention states, "A proposal is suffi-
ciently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicity
fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the
price."103 These three listed terms-type of goods, quantity, and
price-are a safe harbor in which all proposals containing these
terms will be deemed "sufficiently definite."' 4 Open terms may be
filled by a course of conduct,10 5 trade usage,106 or various provisions
of Part III of the Convention.' 07
The Code does not require that a standard set of terms appear
in every offer. Section 2-204(3) provides that open terms will not
cause a contract to fail for indefiniteness if, inter alia, "there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." A course
of dealing or trade usage may be used to interpret, supplement, or
qualify the ambiguous terms of an agreement. 0 8 The Code also in-
stalls various operating presumptions which fill completely open
terms of an agreement.' 0 9
A completely open quantity term prevents contract formation
under both the Code and Convention. Under the Convention, a
98. CISG arts. 14(1) (offer), 18(1) (acceptance).
99. CISG art. 14(1).
100. CISG art. 18(1).
101. U.C.C. § 2-204(l). See, e.g., Kleinschmidt Division of SCM Corp. v. Futronics
Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 972, 363 N.E.2d 701, 395 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1977) (failure to agree to a mate-
rial term does not necessarily prevent contract formation,but when a dispute over material
terms indicates that the intention to contract is not present, formation does not occur).
102. CISG art. 14(1); U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
103. CISG art. 14(1).
104. CISG art. 14(1). There is some ambiguity concerning the role of the three terms
listed in article 14( )-type of goods, quantity, and price. These terms are either a safe harbor
in which all offers bearing these terms will be deemed "sufficiently definite" or a condition that
all offers must satisfy in order to avoid failing for indefiniteness. If these terms are a threshold,
they must always be present in an offer. If the terms create a safe harbor, an offer can be
found even though one or more of these terms are missing. If the three terms are required for
all offers, article 55, which fills a missing price term with the current market price, appears to
serve no purpose. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at § 37.
105. CISG art. 8(3).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., CISG arts. 33 (time of delivery), 55 (price).
108. U.C.C. §§ 2-208 (1), (2); 1-205(3), (5).
109. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (setting the price as "a reasonable price at the time of
delivery") and U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (allowing a reasonable time for shipment or delivery).
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quantity is sufficiently definite if it is explicitly or implicitly fixed or
a method of determining quantity is adopted. 110 The parties have
broad discretion to adopt any quantity formula upon which they can
agree. The Code also affords the parties broad discretion in setting
quantity. The sole substantive limitation on this discretion imposed
by the Code is the requirement that there must be "a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.""' Notwithstanding
this broad discretion, there must be some indication of the quantity
because neither the Code nor the Convention contains a presumption
filling a completely open quantity term. Acceptance or performance
may indicate the quantity if the offer does not.
The statute of frauds contained in Article Two of the Code re-
quires written evidence of the alleged contract as a condition to sub-
mitting evidence of a claim or defense."12 The quantity is the only
term that must appear in the writing." 3 The quantity need not be
stated accurately, but recovery is limited to the amount stated.14 If
the quantity is not stated in writing, it may be evidenced by the act
of accepting and paying for the goods." 5 If the goods must be spe-
cially manufactured, then evidence of quantity is not required" 6 be-
cause the difficulty of selling specialties evidences the seller's com-
mitment to an agreement. The Convention does not require that a
contract be in writing,"' but allows an enacting State to impose a
writing requirement if this protection is desired.""
Both the Code and Convention recognize output and require-
ments contracts. The broad language in article 14 of the Convention
allows these contracts because it does not require that the quantity
be ascertainable any time before performance."' An obligation of
good faith is imposed in output and requirements contracts.2 0 A
quantity agreement calling for all outputs or requirements is under-
stood to mean the actual amount available or required in good
faith.'
2 1
Section 2-306(1) of the Code expressly authorizes output and
requirements contracts and imposes an obligation of good faith and
reasonableness on the parties. Even though a disproportionately large
110. CISG art. 14(I).
IlI. U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
112. U.C.C. § 2-201(l).
113. U.C.C. § 2-201 comment I.
114. Id.
115. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
116. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a).
117. CISG art. 11.
118. CISG art. 12.
119. Commentary, art. 12, note 11.
120. See CISG art. 7(1) (Interpretation of the Convention is to be done with regard to
the need to promote "observance of good faith in international trade.").
121. Commentary, art. 12, note 12.
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quantity is delivered or requested in good faith, it will be unenforce-
able if it is "unreasonably disproportionate" to estimates stated in
the contract or common to experience. 122 An output or requirements
contract meets the standard of definiteness because the quantity pro-
vision is interpreted as the actual good faith output or requirements
of the particular party.1 23
A contract may be formed even though the proposals have been
completely silent concerning price. As with quantity, the Convention
allows the price to be set explicitly, implicitly, or by formula.124 If
there are neither explicit nor implicit provisions for determining
price, then article 55 supplies an implied reference to the market
price prevailing at the time the contract is concluded.
The Code allows the price term to be left open during contract
formation.'25 A reasonable price at the time of delivery is inserted if
the term is left open and the parties nonetheless intend to be
bound.12 6 Even though the price may not be presently ascertainable,
there is usually a "reasonably certain basis for granting an appropri-
ate remedy for breach," so that the contract need not fail for indefi-
niteness if the dominant intention of the parties is to be bound.'27
2. The Moment an Offer Takes Effect-Dispatch and Receipt
Theories.-Contract formation is affected by the choice between the
dispatch and receipt theories of when a communication becomes ef-
fective. The theory chosen determines whether a contract is formed
in the event an offeree's letter of acceptance is lost in the mail and
fails to reach the offeror.
The common law adopts a rule of dispatch, with contract for-
mation taking place when the offeree mails an acceptance. 28 The
offeror bears the risk of delay or nondelivery if the offeree dispatches
an acceptance by a medium explicitly or implicitly authorized by the
offeror. Civil law systems generally adopt the receipt theory, delay-
ing contract formation until the offeror receives notice of accept-
ance.'2 9 Inherent in the contracting process is a hiatus between the
dispatch and receipt of a communication. During this hiatus, the ad-
dressee does not know that a communication has been dispatched,
which is problematic because neither party can control the risk of a
122. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
123. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) comment 2.
124. Article 8 of the Convention provides standards for developing the implied terms of
an agreement.
125. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) comment.
126. U.C.C. § 2-305.
127. U.C.C. § 2-305(4) comment 1.
128. Eorsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 317 (1979).
129. Id. at 317.
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frustrated transmission. Under the dispatch theory, a communication
may be effective even though its transmission has been frustrated.
The rule of receipt denies effect to a lost or delayed message. Despite
this fundamental difference, both rules allow a party acting in good
faith to labor under a disadvantage.
In most instances, the Convention embodies the civil law tradi-
tion of the receipt theory. An offer,1 30 withdrawal of an offer, 1 ' rev-
ocation of an offer, 32 termination of an offer by rejection,133 and a
statement of acceptance134 become effective only upon receipt.
Domestic common law adopts a rule of receipt concerning offers
and a rule of dispatch for acceptances. Acceptance takes effect upon
dispatch regardless of whether it ever reaches the offeror, so long as
it is made in a manner and by a medium invited by the offer.'3 5 In
contrast, a communication must be received by the offeree for it to
revoke an offer; receipt of an offeror's manifestation of intent not to
enter into the proposed contract terminates an offeree's power of ac-
ceptance. 3' Unless the offeror reserves the power to revoke the offer
without notice, the offeree may rely on the original offer and will
remain unaffected by any undisclosed changes of mind by the
offeror.'3 7
Acceptance may be made by performing an act in response to
an offer. The Convention departs from the rule of receipt in deter-
mining when acceptance by conduct becomes effective. Article 18(3)
allows action to be immediately effective as an acceptance without
notice when sanctioned by a course of dealing or trade usage. Sec-
tion 2-206(2) of the Code allows acceptance by an act, but requires
notification of the offeror within a reasonable time. It has been sug-
gested that courts will invoke the good faith requirement of article
7(1), and require the offeree to provide notice of acceptance within a
reasonable time after accepting by performance. 138 If the Convention
does not require notice of acceptance by action, then it will not syn-
chronize with the Code on this point.
3. Withdrawal of an Offer.-An offeror may wish to withdraw
an offer after it has been dispatched. If the offeree issues an accept-
ance after withdrawal has been dispatched, it becomes important to
130. CISG art. 15(1).
131. CISG art. 15(2).
132. CISG art. 16(1).
133. CISG art. 17.
134. CISG art. 18(2).
135. REST. 2d § 63.
136. REST. 2d § 42.
137. REST. 2d § 42 comment b.
138. Winship, Formation of International Sales Contracts Under the 1980 Vienna Con-
vention, 17 INTL LAW. 1, 10 (1983).
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discern the periods when the offer and withdrawal are effective.
Article 1 5 of the Convention determines when an offer becomes
effective and governs withdrawal of an offer. Article 15 provides a
special rule of formation for the situation in which withdrawal over-
takes the offer and arrives first. An offer, even if irrevocable, 139 be-
comes effective only when it reaches the offeree." ° The power of ac-
ceptance arises when the offer takes effect. An offer, whether
revocable or irrevocable, may be withdrawn "if the withdrawal
reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer."14 ' No-
tice of withdrawal prevents the power of acceptance from arising in
the offeree, and a contract will not arise from a subsequent
acceptance.
The Restatement parallels the Convention in determining the
effect of an offer. Under the Restatement, the offeree's power of ac-
ceptance arises when the offeror's manifestation of assent is com-
plete. I The power of acceptance may be terminated, 43 and a con-
tract cannot be accepted once termination of the power occurs. 44
The rule of receipt governs termination, which occurs when "the of-
feree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to
enter into the proposed contract."145 As under the Convention, the
offeree cannot accept when withdrawal overtakes an offer and
reaches the offeree first.
4. Revocation of an Offer.-Both the Convention and the Re-
statement allow revocation of an offer before the offeree has dis-
patched an acceptance. Revocation of an offer becomes effective
when it has reached the offeree.
Article 16(1) of the Convention states, "Until a contract is con-
cluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree
before he has dispatched an acceptance." The Convention presumes
an offer to be revocable, but it becomes irrevocable upon dispatch of
acceptance. An offer continues to be irrevocable until a contract is
concluded. A contract is concluded when acceptance becomes effec-
tive,1 46 which occurs when it reaches the offeror. 4 ' The rules of the
Convention create a hiatus between the dispatch and receipt of ac-
ceptance. During this hiatus, the offer has become irrevocable but a
139. The result is the same whether an offer is revocable or irrevocable because article
15(2) provides that an offer may be withdrawn even if it is irrevocable. Revocation of an offer
is discussed in section IV.A.4. infra.
140. CISG art. 15(l).
141. CISG art. 15(2).
142. REST. 2d § 35(l) comment b.
143. See REST. 2d § 36.
144. REST. 2d § 35(2).
145. REST. 2d § 42.
146. CISG art. 23.
147. CISG art. 18(2).
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contract has not yet been formed.
Domestic common law makes an offer irrevocable upon dispatch
of an acceptance, with contract formation also occurring at this
point. The power of acceptance is terminated when notice of revoca-
tion is received by the offeree.' 48 The "mail box rule" makes accept-
ance effective upon dispatch if done in a manner invited by the of-
fer. "'49 The hiatus between dispatch and receipt of acceptance has
diminished significance under the mail box rule because a lost or
delayed communication does not prevent contract formation once the
offer has become irrevocable.
While an offer is presumed to be revocable, it may be made
irrevocable by the offeror's statement to this effect or by the offeree's
reliance on his power of acceptance. An express statement creates an
irrevocable offer under article 16(2)(a) of the Convention and Code
section 2-205. Reliance on an offer is a basis of irrevocability under
article 16(2)(b) of the Convention and section 87(2) of the
Restatement.
Article 16(2)(b) of the Convention states that an offer may not
be revoked if it indicates that it is irrevocable. Irrevocability under
this provision does not require that the offeror promise to refrain
from revocation and does not require consideration supporting such a
promise. 5 ' The Convention position reflects the judgment that in in-
ternational commercial relations, the offeree should be able to rely
on any statement by the offeror indicating that the offer will be held
open for a period of time.' 5 '
Section 2-205 of the Code provides a special rule concerning
"firm offers." An offer that indicates that it will be held open for a
period of time is not irrevocable for want of consideration if several
conditions are met.1 52 In addition to giving assurance that it will be
held open, the offer must be: (1) made by a merchant, (2) in a
signed writing, and (3) separately signed by the offeror near the
term of assurance if the contract form is provided by the offeree. 5 3
If the period of irrevocability is not stated, then the offer remains
irrevocable for a reasonable time. 54 In any event, the maximum pe-
riod of irrevocability is three months.1 55
148. REST. 2d § 42.
149. REST. 2d § 63.
150. Commentary, art. 14, note 6.
151. Id. An offer may indicate its irrevocability in many ways. Irrevocability certainly
arises when the offer states that it is irrevocable or will not be revoked for a period of time. Id.
at art. 14, note 7.
152. U.C.C. § 2-205.
153. Id. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Wilson, 166 Mont. 346, 532 P.2d 988 (1975) (copies
of written contracts for the sale of wheat which contained the terms of an oral agreement and
were signed by the seller were binding on the seller as an irrevocable offer).
154. U.C.C. § 2-205.
155. Id. Because § 2-205 addresses only offers that are not supported by consideration,
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The Code places more conditions on irrevocability than does the
Convention. The first condition of Code section 2-205, that a firm
offer may be made by only a merchant, has its parallel in the general
provision barring application of the Convention to consumer transac-
tions. 156 The section 2-205 writing requirement has no parallel in the
Convention because the Convention does not require contracts to be
in writing unless a state adopts a statute of frauds, an exercise of the
option to override article 11 which is allowed by articles 12 and 96.
The three month limit to the period of irrevocability also has no ana-
log in the Convention; the Commentary indicates that an offer
should remain irrevocable for a period of time necessary for the of-
feree to accept. These differences between the Code and Convention
allow an offer to be deemed irrevocable under the Convention even
though the conditions surrounding a firm offer under the Code have
not been met.
A second exception to the general rule of irrevocability arises
when there has been reasonable reliance on an offer. This exception
addresses the situation in which an offer cannot be evaluated without
costly investigation. Article 16(2)(b) of the Convention provides that
an offer cannot be revoked "if it was reasonable for the offeree to
rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in
reliance on the offer." An offer inviting such reliance is irrevocable
for the time required for its evaluation.1 57
The role of article 16(2)(b) is illustrated by the case of a sup-
plier who knows that his offer to supply building materials will be
relied upon by a builder in submitting a bid. 58 It is thought to be
reasonable for the builder to rely on the offer because the supplier
knew that the builder would incorporate the offer into his bid. Rea-
sonable reliance by the offeree renders the offer irrevocable. If the
bid is accepted, the builder has the power to accept the supply offer.
The same result is reached under domestic common law.1 59
The domestic common law concerning revocation of an offer is
found in section 87(2) of the Restatement. This section creates an
exception to the requirement that consideration be present in con-
tract formation. 60 "An offer which the offeror should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the
the three month restraint does not limit the duration of an irrevocable offer if consideration is
present. Id. at comment 3.
156. CISG art. 2(a).
157. Commentary, art. 14, note 8.
158. J. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at § 144.
159. REST. 2d § 87(2). See, e.g., Jenkins & Boiler Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, 36 111.
App. 3d 1044, 344 N.E.2d 275 (1976) (doctrine of promissory estoppel used to bind subcon-
tractor to bid because general contractor relied on bid in making his own bid and subcontrac-
tor reasonably should have expected such reliance).
160. REST. 2d § 87(2).
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part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice." ''
Section 87(2) applies the general concept of reliance"6 2 to the
unaccepted offer. This special application occurs most often when
the acts done in reliance on the offer are not part of performance.' 6"
If beginning performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, then
sections 45 and 62 generate contract formation rather than merely
making the offer irrevocable. If reliance is such that the offeree must
incur substantial expense, undertake commitments, or forego alter-
natives in order to make acceptance possible, then section 87(2) cre-
ates an option contract, rendering the offer irrevocable. The reliance
must be both substantial and foreseeable.6 4
The remedy provided by section 87(2) of the Restatement is to
render the offer "binding to the extent necessary to avoid injustice."
Full enforcement of the terms offered is not appropriate in all cases;
restitution of benefits conferred may be adequate. 6 5 The remedy
provided by Part II of the Convention is to hold the offer open 66 so
that the offeree can accept, concluding a contract.6 7
5. Termination of the Power of Acceptance by Rejection or
Counter Offer.-The power of acceptance is terminated by a rejec-
tion of the offer.6 8 Termination occurs when rejection reaches the
offeror. 6 9 Article 17 of the Convention states, "An offer, even if it is
irrevocable, is terminated when a rejection reaches the offeror."
Under section 38(1) of the Restatement, the power of acceptance is
terminated by a rejection. Under section 40, termination occurs
when the rejection is received. The reason for employing the rule of
receipt is that while the offeror should be permitted to make plans'70
promptly and utilize his resources effectively in reliance on the of-
feree's rejection, such reliance cannot occur until the offeror receives
the rejection. 171
When one communication overtakes and arrives before another,
the essential rule is that the power of acceptance is not terminated
161. Id.
162. REST. 2d § 90.
163. REST. 2d § 87(2) comment e.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. CISG art. 16(2)(b).
167. CISG arts. 18, 23.
168. CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 38(I).
169. CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 40.
170. The reaction of the offeror to a rejection may involve, for example, extending offers
to others or revising production schedules.
171. See Commentary, art. 15, note 1; REST. 2d § 38(2) comment a; J. HONNOLD,
supra note 54, at § 153.
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until a rejection reaches the offeror. A contract is not concluded if
acceptance of an offer is overtaken by a rejection. 172 If an accept-
ance arrives before a rejection, then contract formation takes place,
the rejection having no effect.173 When an acceptance and a rejection
are both in transit at the same time, the rule of receipt places them
in a race to reach the offeror.
The Restatement departs from the Convention on the issue of
whether an irrevocable offer is terminated by its rejection. The Re-
statement provides that the power of acceptance under an option
contract 74 is not terminated by a rejection or counter offer.175 The
Convention does not distinguish between revocable and irrevocable
offers on the issue of termination by rejection. 76
An acceptance modifying an offer will sometimes terminate the
power of acceptance. If a varied acceptance is deemed a counter of-
fer under article 19(1) of the Convention, then there is an implied
rejection of the offer, and the power of acceptance is terminated. 77
If a reply is a counter offer under the criteria of Restatement section
39(1), then the counter offer terminates the power of acceptance
under section 39(2).7 s If a varied acceptance arrives before an un-
conditional acceptance, then it will either terminate the power of ac-
ceptance as a rejection or be effective as a varied acceptance.
B. Acceptance
1. Manifestation of Assent.-The chief characteristic of ac-
ceptance is the manifestation of assent to the terms of the offer.' 79
Acceptance takes effect at different times under the Convention and
Restatement. Differences also appear in the ways the Code and Con-
vention treat acceptance by action.
Manifestation of assent is essential to acceptance under the
Convention, Code and Restatement.'"0 Under the Convention, "A
statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent
172. CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 40.
173. CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 40.
174. An irrevocable offer is termed an "option contract" by section 25 of the
Restatement.
175. REST. 2d § 37. Although there are no reported cases deciding whether a firm offer
made under section 2-205 of the Code will be terminated by its rejection, Professor Honnold
has suggested that a court would not force the offeror to hold the offer open in the absence of
consideration. J. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at § 154.
176. CISG art. 17.
177. Acceptance modifying an offer is considered more closely in section IV.B.3. infra.
178. See, e.g., Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975) (reply to
offer of cotton output contract that added projected yields when offer had not indicated antici-
pated quantity was a counter offer rather than an acceptance; subsequent reply omitting the
projected yields was ineffective because power of acceptance had been terminated).
179. CISG art. 18(1); REST. 2d § 50(1); U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
180. CISG art. 18(1); U.C.C. § 2-204(1); REST. 2d § 50(1).
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to an offer is an acceptance."' 1 Contract formation occurs under the
Code when there is a manifestation of agreement.' 2 The Restate-
ment defines acceptance as "a manifestation of assent to the terms of
[an offer] made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.' ' 3
The offeree usually cannot manifest assent through inaction.
Article 18(1) of the Convention states, "Silence or inactivity does
not in itself amount to acceptance." Acceptance may take place if
silence occurs in conjunction with other factors that allow the silence
itself to indicate assent. An express agreement concerning the effect
of silence may be made under article 6. Such an agreement may also
be implicit in the negotiations, course of dealing, trade usage, or
other conduct of the parties as interpreted under article 8.
Under Section 69 of the Restatement, silence or inactivity con-
stitutes acceptance if: (a) the offeree knowingly accepts a benefit for
which compensation is expected, (b) the offeror expressly or implic-
itly indicates that silence will be understood as acceptance and the
offeree remains silent with the intent to accept, or (c) previous deal-
ings make it reasonable for the offeree to notify the offeror if he does
not intend to accept.
An express agreement that an order will be deemed accepted if
the seller does not respond within ten days allows acceptance to oc-
cur when ten days of silence have passed. A rejection sent by the
seller on the eleventh day will have no effect. If parties have devel-
oped a practice in which the seller always ships the goods as ordered
without acknowledging the order, then the silence of the seller com-
bines with shipment of the goods to produce acceptance. Because si-
lence indicates acceptance within the established course of conduct,
the buyer may recover for breach of contract if the seller does not
ship the goods and fails to notify the buyer.
It may be difficult to establish the intent to be bound when for-
mation takes place during contract negotiations. If an exchange of
communications cannot be clearly identified as an offer and accept-
ance, the Convention requires close scrutiny of the proposals to de-
termine their underlying intentions. The Code recognizes that con-
tract negotiations may be ambiguous while the conduct of the parties
indicates that a binding obligation has been undertaken. In response
to this situation, the Code provides that, "An agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment.
of its making is undetermined.' 84
181. CISG art. 18(1).
182. U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
183. REST. 2d § 50(1).
184. U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
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2. The Moment Acceptance Takes Effect-Dispatch and Re-
ceipt Theories.-The Convention determines the moment acceptance
takes effect by the rule of receipt, but the Restatement uses the rule
of dispatch. Article 18(2) provides that acceptance "becomes effec-
tive at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror." An
indication of assent is not effective immediately upon dispatch. Ac-
ceptance is effective only if it reaches the offeror within either the
time set by the offer or a reasonable time if the term is left open. 185
The receipt theory places the risk of unsuccessful or delayed trans-
mission on the sender-offeree.
The Restatement employs the rule of dispatch, known as the
"mail box rule," in setting the time acceptance takes effect. Accept-
ance made in a manner invited by the offeror takes effect as soon as
it is put out of the offeree's possession, regardless of whether it ever
reaches the offeror.186 When acceptance is made by a promise, it is
essential that either the offeree use reasonable diligence in attempt-
ing to notify the offeror or that the offeror receive the acceptance
seasonably.1 87 Acceptance under an option contract, however, is not
effective until received.' 8
Both the Code and Convention recognize acceptance when
made by an act as distinguished from a statement, but their notice
requirements differ. Article 18(3) of the Convention allows the of-
feror to indicate assent by performing an act without giving notice to
the offeror. This form of acceptance must be sanctioned by a trade
usage or course of conduct if it is not expressly invited by the of-
feror.'8 9 Paragraph (3) further provides that acceptance is effective
at the moment the act is performed.
It is not altogether clear whether paragraph (3) adopts the time
of dispatch or receipt as the moment when acceptance by perform-
ance takes effect. When read literally, the text of paragraph (3) does
not appear to require communication with the recipient-offeror. 90
Although acceptance must indicate assent under paragraph (1) and
the indication of assent must reach the offeror under paragraph (2),
paragraph (3) keys on the date of performance as the mcment ac-
ceptance by an act becomes effective. It is reasonable to believe that
a particular act must indicate acceptance in an objective manner,
which would allow an independent observer to perceive the inten-
tion. '' The requirement of objectivity, however, may serve an evi-
185. CISG art. 55.
186. REST. 2d § 63(a).
187. REST. 2d § 56.
188. REST. 2d § 63(b).
189. CISG art. 18(3).
190. A literal explication of article 18(3) may be found in Eorsi, supra note 128, at 318.
191. Winship, supra note 138, at 11.
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dentiary function without addressing the question of whether the of-
feror must be made aware of the act. A literal reading of paragraph
(3) relieves the offeree of giving a supplemental indication of assent
even though the act is not inherently communicative.192
It has been suggested that paragraph (3) does not authorize the
offeree to conclude a contract solely by performance if the offeror is
not informed within the time period established by paragraph (2). 1"3
Although paragraph (3) expressly dispenses with a notice require-
ment, this must be viewed against the background of paragraph (1),
under which acceptance requires communication. Notwithstanding
the general requirement of communication, it is difficult to see how a
notice requirement can be imposed in light of a provision dispensing
with notice in special circumstances.
The Code provides that an offer shall be construed as inviting
acceptance "in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances." '194 Acceptance may be made by either a promise or
performance if this is reasonable under the terms of the offer.' 95 Al-
though the Code allows acceptance to be made by an act of perform-
ance, it departs from the Convention by requiring notice of accept-
ance. Prompt or current shipment of conforming goods is an
acceptance, 196 but if the offeror is not notified within a reasonable
time, he may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance. 19 7
A key difference between the Code and Convention is in their
writing requirements. The Convention does not impose any require-
ments on the form a contract may take, 9 ' but a state may elect to
impose a writing requirement. 199 The Code has a special Statute of
Frauds applicable to sales.200
The Code and Convention both recognize that a party who un-
dertakes acceptance by performance is vulnerable because of his
financial commitment to the contract. The Convention protects the
offeree by making acceptance effective upon the beginning of per-
formance.2 1' The offer cannot be revoked once the offeree has relied
on the offer by making an investment in the contract.20 2 The Code
192. For example, if an order invites acceptance by shipment of goods, a literal reading
will deem acceptance complete upon shipment of the goods rather than upon the buyer's re-
ceipt of supplementary notice or arrival of the goods.
193. J. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at § 164.
194. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(a). Similar language is used in REST. 2d § 30(2).
195. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b); REST. 2d §§ 30(2), 32.
196. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b).
197. U.C.C. § 2-206(2).
198. Particular reference is made to writing requirements when rejecting all require-
ments as to form in article 11.
199. CISG arts. 12, 96.
200. U.C.C. § 2-201.
201. CISG art. 18(3).
202. CISG art. 16(2)(b).
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relieves a party of the writing requirements of section 2-201 to the
extent that specially manufactured goods have been produced,"' or
to the extent that either payment or the goods have been received
and accepted.20 4 Because they entail a financial commitment, these
acts are sufficiently objective evidence of intent to allow the writing
requirements to be relaxed.
3. The Effect of a Varied Acceptance.-Several issues arise
when an acceptance varies the terms of an offer. It must be deter-
mined whether a contract has been formed and which terms are in-
cluded. The battle of the forms-an attempt to secure advantageous
terms in an exchange of purposefully drafted printed forms-often
provides the setting for a varied acceptance. Both the Code and Con-
vention address these problems directly.20 5 The chief difference be-
tween the Code and Convention concerns the effect of an acceptance
that materially alters the terms of an offer.
Under both the Code and the Convention, a varied acceptance
creates a contract if it does not materially alter the terms of the
offer.20 6 Article 19 of the Convention reaches this result by first lay-
ing down a strict mirror image rule requiring exact compliance with
the offer. Article 19(1) states, "A reply to an offer which purports to
be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations, or other modifi-
cations is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer."
Paragraph (2) softens the rigid mirror image rule of paragraph (1).
If the additional or different terms do not materially alter the offer,
then the reply is an acceptance and a contract is concluded.20 7 Sec-
tion 2-207(1) of the Code provides that "[a] definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon . . ,20.
The Code and Convention take different approaches when a va-
ried acceptance materially alters the terms of an offer. Under the
Convention, the strict mirror image rule of article 19(1) remains in
effect, and the varied acceptance is a rejection and counter offer. As
203. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a).
204. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
205. CISG art. 19; U.C.C. § 2-207.
206. CISG art. 19; U.C.C. § 2-207(1), (2).
207. CISG art. 23.
208. U.C.C. § 2-207(l) (emphdisis added). Additional evidence that the Code has aban-
doned the mirror image rule can be found in sections 2-204(3) and 2-206. Section 2-204(3)
honors a contract even though one or more terms have been left open, allowing contract forma-
tion even though the parties have failed to agree on various terms. If the Code supplies a term
different from that proposed by the offeror, he may have obligations different from those he
proposed. A varied acceptance in the form of a shipment of non-conforming goods may be
effective under section 2-206(l)(b).
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a rejection, the varied acceptance terminates the power of accept-
ance.20 9 As a counter offer, the varied proposal is subject to accept-
ance, making it the basis of a contract. An acceptance that materi-
ally varies an offer does not conclude a contract under the
Convention. 1
A material variation of the offer does not prevent contract for-
mation under the Code. Acceptance is effective under section 2-
207(1) notwithstanding material alterations. Section 2-207(2)(b)
protects the offeror by keeping the material alterations from entering
the contract.21'
Materiality ultimately limits application of the Code because a
response to an offer may fail to qualify as a "definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation" if the terms vary
so greatly that the offeror cannot reasonably treat the response as an
acceptance.2"2 Such a widely divergent response will be deemed a
counter offer, which terminates the power of acceptance. 213
The special provisions of the Code and Convention are brought
into play only when a reply purports to be an acceptance. A reply
that makes inquiries or suggests the possibility of additional terms
will not invoke either section 2-207 or article 19 if it does not pur-
port to be an acceptance. This feature allows contract negotiations to
progress without a counter offer terminating the power of acceptance
by rejection.2"4
The offeror may retain control of the terms of the offer by ob-
jecting to the varied terms of the acceptance. The Convention pro-
vides that if the offeror objects without undue delay, then the varied
acceptance is a rejection, and acceptance does not occur.21 5 The
modifications contained in the varied acceptance enter the contract if
the offeror does not so object.21 6 Under the Code, an objection by the
offeror prevents the modifications from entering the contract, but an
objection does not stop contract formation. 217 The Code also allows
the offeror to achieve this result with an offer that expressly limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer.21 '8 The Convention will honor an
209. CISG art. 17.
210. See CISG art. 18(l), (2).
211. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1977) (because discount of 1.4 cents per gallon was a material term in negotiations for
sale of oil, term in acceptance allowing the seller to unilaterally revoke discount was a material
modification that did not become part of the contract).
212. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
213. REST. 2d § 39(2).
214. See CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 38(1).
215. CISG art. 19(2).
216. Id.
217. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c).
218. U.C.C. § 2-208(2)(a).
Fall 1984]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
express limitation of the power of acceptance, 19 but a contract will
not be formed because a varied acceptance does not indicate assent
to an offer that has expressly limited acceptance to the terms of the
offer. 2 ' The result common to both systems is that by objecting to a
varied acceptance, the offeror can avoid a situation in which the
party having the last word sets the terms of the contract.
Because the Code fosters contract formation even in the pres-
ence of material variations and objection by the offeror, the offeree
may be drawn into a contract by a varied acceptance. The offeree
can avoid contracting under the terms of the offer by expressly mak-
ing acceptance conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms." 1 If a varied acceptance is conditional, then it is a counter
offer, and contract formation does not take place. 22 This problem is
not as severe under the Convention because contract formation does
not occur when there is a material variation or objection.22 3 The of-
feree can'be unintentionally bound to only non-material variations
from the acceptance when the offeree objects. 24
If goods are tendered, accepted, and paid for before a dispute
arises, it may be clear that the parties intended to contract although
it is difficult to identify an offer and an acceptance. The Code con-
tains a special provision removing the need to determine which act or
document constituted the offer and which the acceptance in this situ-
ation. 2 5 Section 2-207(3) provides, "Conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a con-
tract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract." 2 " A contract based on conduct consists of
"those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of [the Code] ."27 Because the Convention does not contain a
special rule analogous to Code section 2-207(3), it is necessary to
discern an offer and acceptance in the conduct of the parties.
4. The Effect of a Late Acceptance.-A late acceptance does
not conclude a contract under the general rules of the Restatement
and the Convention, but a late acceptance is afforded special treat-
ment by a separate provision of the Convention. The general rule of
219. CISG art. 6.
220. CISG art. 18(l).
221. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
222. REST. 2d §§ 59 comment a, 39(1) comment b.
223. CISG art. 19(1), (2).
224. CISG art. 19(2).
225. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 7.
226. Relief from the writing requirements of section 2-201 is available to the extent
payment or goods have been received and accepted. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
227. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
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the Convention, found in article 18(2), is that an offer lapses before
arrival of a late acceptance, a late acceptance having no effect upon
arrival. Section 70 of the Restatement provides that an acceptance
reaching the offeror after the offer has lapsed is a counter-offer. Ac-
cordingly, creation of a contract requires acceptance of the counter
offer by the original offeror. The differences between domestic law
and the Convention originate with article 21 of the Convention,
which allows ratification or cancellation of a late acceptance by the
offeror. These procedures have no parallels in domestic law.
Article 21(1) allows an offeror to ratify a late acceptance. Para-
graph (1) provides that "[a] late acceptance is nevertheless effective
as an acceptance if without delay the offeror orally so informs the
offeree or dispatches a notice" that he will honor the acceptance.2 28
Paragraph (1) may be invoked when the offeree dispatches his ac-
ceptance too late for timely arrival by the means chosen.2 Although
an offer lapses if there is an untimely dispatch of acceptance, the
offeror is able to unilaterally conclude a contract by giving notice
that he will honor the acceptance. 23 0 The power to ratify a late ac-
ceptance allows the offeror to speculate during the hiatus between
the lapse of an offer and arrival of a late acceptance. The offeree can
protect himself against price changes during this hiatus by with-
drawing acceptance through a means that will reach the offeror
before the acceptance. 1
The mechanics of article 21(1) illustrate a theory that differs
from the domestic rationale. Under both the Convention and domes-
tic law, a contract is formed only if the original offeror informs the
offeree of his intent to be bound by the late acceptance. The contract
formed under the Convention is based on the original offer. 32 Al-
though once void, a late acceptance takes effect upon ratification by
the offeror. The effect of the late acceptance is retroactive from the
moment of its receipt. 3 a The counter offer is the foundation of the
contract under domestic law .23 Notice by the original offeror serves
as an acceptance and becomes effective upon dispatch.2 35
Article 21(2) allows an offeree to cancel a late acceptance that
would have ordinarily been effective. Paragraph (2) is invoked when
an apparent delay in transmission causes an acceptance to arrive late
even though given timely dispatch. A late acceptance is automati-
228. CISG art. 21(1).
229. See CISG art. 21(2).
230. CISG art. 21(1).
231. See CISG art. 22.
232. CISG art. 21(1).
233. Commentary, art. 19, note 3.
234. See REST. 2d § 70 comment b.
235. REST. 2d § 63(a).
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cally effective if it bears a date showing that it would have reached
the offeror in time had it not been delayed.' However, a late ac-
ceptance is not effective if, without delay, the offeror gives notice
that he considers his offer to have lapsed.13 7 There is a burden on the
offeror to notify the offeree of the delay in transmission when a
dated acceptance indicates that the offeree expected the acceptance
to arrive in due time. Failure to notify the offeree that his accept-
ance will not be honored allows contract formation to occur when
acceptance reaches the offeror. If the letter of acceptance is not
dated or the date shows a late dispatch, then the offeror may exer-
cise his powers under paragraph (1).
The mail box rule of domestic common law avoids the problem
of delays in the transmission of an otherwise timely acceptance be-
cause acceptance of a revocable offer is effective upon dispatch.2 38 If
acceptance is dispatched in a timely manner, it is effective regardless
of when it reaches the offeror2 39 Since acceptance of an option con-
tract is not effective until it reaches the offeror,24 ° contract formation
in this case does not occur if the communication is frustrated.2 41
5. Withdrawal of Acceptance.-Withdrawal of acceptance is
treated differently by the Convention and Restatement because of
the differences in the dispatch and receipt theories of acceptance. A
wrinkle in the receipt theory of the Convention overrides the with-
drawal rules when acceptance is made by an act. Article 22 of the
Convention provides, "An acceptance may be withdrawn if the with-
drawal reaches the offeror before or at the same time as the accept-
ance would have become effective." Article 18(2) deems an accept-
ance effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the
offeror, but article 18(3) allows acceptance to be effective immedi-
ately if done by performing an act. When acceptance is made by
action there is no hiatus between the times acceptance takes place
and when it takes effect, meaning that acceptance cannot be with-
drawn in this situation.42
Domestic common law distinguishes between revocable and ir-
revocable offers in addressing to withdrawal of acceptance. Accept-
ance of a revocable offer cannot be withdrawn because it is effective
236. CISG art. 21(2).
237. Id.
238. REST. 2d § 63(a).
239. REST. 2d § 63(a) comment c.
240. REST. 2d § 63(b).
241. REST. 2d § 63(b) comment f.
242. The treatment given withdrawal of acceptance by article 22 parallels the with-
drawal of offers under article 15. Both illustrate a general principle that a communication may
be withdrawn by a subsequent communication that overtakes it. The discussion of article 15
concerning the rule of receipt applies also to article 22.
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upon dispatch.243 Acceptance of an option contract, an irrevocable
offer, is not operative until received by the offeror.24" Accordingly,
an irrevocable offer can be withdrawn by a communication that
overtakes an earlier acceptance.
C. Summary
Many provisions of the Convention should be familiar to domes-
tic lawyers, but several provisions will require consideration of the
convention's theory of receipt. The criteria of an offer, 45 revocation
of an offer,2"' and termination of an offer by rejection 247 each receive
similar treatment under the Convention and domestic law. Care
must be used when confronting issues concerning the time an offer2 48
or acceptance2 49 takes effect, withdrawal of acceptance,2 50 and the
effect of a varied251 or late acceptance.2 52 The rule of receipt and the
rule of dispatch call for different approaches to these situations. The
presence of differences between the Convention and domestic law
should not draw criticism because the international effort is aimed at
achieving uniformity. The value of the Convention is that it will be
easier to master than the myriad laws of foreign forums that pres-
ently govern international transactions.
V. Conclusion
The value of the Convention is in the degree of uniformity it
can bring to the law of international sales. The development of inter-
national trade requires that legal obligations be both predictable and
free of influence from variations in domestic laws. Because compro-
mise is inherent in an international agreement, the Convention does
not conform to American domestic law in all respects. Adapting to
international standards will be a worthwhile compromise if it secures
the benefits of uniformity.
The substantive rules of the Convention addressing contract for-
mation should prove workable because they are drawn from estab-
lished practices in various legal traditions. The nonsubstantive provi-
sions of the Convention-its sphere of applicability and the options
in ratification-have raised questions over the extent to which the
Convention will bring about uniformity. The success of the Conven-
243. REST. 2d § 63(a) comment c.
244. REST. 2d § 63(b).
245. CISG art. 14; U.C.C. § 2-204.
246. CISG arts. 15(2), 16; REST. 2d § 42.
247. CISG art. 17; REST. 2d § 42.
248. CISG art. 15(1); REST. 2d § 35 comment b.
249. CISG art. 18; REST. 2d § 63.
250. CISG art. 22; REST. 2d § 63.
251. CISG art. 19; U.C.C. § 2-207.
252. CISG art. 21; REST. 2d § 70.
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tion will be determined by the answers to these questions concerning
uniformity.
James Edward Joseph
